Arguments for and against the existence of an American cultural divide are frequently placed in a religious context. This paper seeks to establish that, all politics aside, the American religious divide is real, that modern religious polarization is not a uniquely American phenomenon, and that religious divides can be understood as naturally emergent within the club theory of religion. Analysis of the 2005 Baylor University Religion Survey reveals a bimodal distribution of religious commitment in the United States. International survey data reveals evidence of bimodal distributions in all twenty-nine surveyed countries. The club theory of religion, when applied in a multi-agent model, generates bimodal distributions of religious commitment whose emergence correlates to the substitutability of club goods for standard goods and the mean population wage rate. This tendency towards religious polarization has important ramifications for majority rule electoral outcomes when religion is politically salient. Majority rule, principally analogous to the statistical median, is a non-robust estimator of bimodally distributed voter preferences.
major religious surveys, finding evidence of religious divides in the United States and in 27 other countries (out of 30 surveyed) from around the world. The prevalence of religious divides opens the possibility for a theory wherein religious polarization is a standard outcome. We build a model of religious group membership in a heterogeneous population of utility maximizing agents using a multi-agent variation of the club theory of religion (Iannaccone 1992; Berman 2000; McBride 2007) . Simulation testing of the model shows that a population of agents with a unimodal distribution of incomes consistently emerges a bimodal distribution of agents' commitment to their religious clubs. Model results suggest that the U.S. political landscape is less likely derivative of a historically novel cultural divide, but rather the result of a religious divide naturally emergent of religious clubs, membership requirements, and group identity.
The importance of the hypothesized divide and its impact on American electoral outcomes is uncertain. There is seemingly contradictory survey evidence that while religiosity dominates income in voter choice (Shapiro et al. 2005; Glaeser and Ward 2006) , economic policy preferences, though weakening over time, still dominate moral preferences in voters' estimation of their own decision-making process (Ansolabehere, Rodden et al. 2006) . One potential source of these seemingly contradictory findings may be the distributional shapes of moral and economic preferences, each indexed in a single dimension issue space, which, in the context of the median voter theorem, lead to potentially different responses from votemaximizing politicians. In the classic Hotelling-Downs model, the unimodal distribution of voters' economic preferences should lead to strong convergence in the platforms of competing politicians (Fiorina 1999) . 1 Ansolabehere et al find their index of religious and moral values, however, to be bimodally distributed across their survey respondents. When voters preferences in 3 a single dimension issue space are bimodal, greater candidate platform divergence may follow (Calvert 1985; Holcombe 1989; Medoff et al. 1995) . 2 Ansolabehere et al, however, take care to point out that their multi-peaked moral values distribution is consequent of the abortion issue; if we leave this issue out of the scale, the distribution takes on a more unimodal shape. While abortion is an inherently divisive issue on its own accord, given its strong connections to religious values (Evans et al. 2001) , its impact on the distribution of survey responses might also reflect an underlying divide of broader significance. Separate religious subpopulations are relevant to the current political landscape, particularly in the context of a unimodal distribution of economic preferences. Under these conditions, politicians have incentive to converge rapidly to near identical positions on economic issues, while deviating from potentially "median" positions in both their official platform and coded messages concerning the two religious subpopulations. If this were in fact the case, it would reconcile the finding that religion has become more salient than income in voting decisions with the concurrent evidence that voters place greater weight on their economic preferences. Voters may care more about economic issues, but they are left with religiously informed issues as their means of differentiating between rival candidates.
The empirical observation of religious divides and their emergence with our club theoretic model of religious populations has important ramifications for the stability of electoral outcomes under majority rule. In statistical analysis, bimodal distributions have the peculiar property that the median is a less-robust estimator of central tendency than the mean. If we conceive of voter preferences as a one-dimensional continuum, the median of voter preferences will be considerably more influenced by small sample differences when the distribution is 2 Most theories of divergence from the median voter theorem when preferences are bimodal rest on ideas of voter alienation and abstention. Other theories, however, find that bimodality can leave the median outcome unchanged, or lead to the absence of a stable strategy prediction (Davis et al. 1970). bimodal. Levy (1989) identifies not just these statistical properties, but also the historical and philosophical contexts of bimodal voter preferences as explanations for faction, political violence, and the rise of tyranny. Under the bimodality scenario, small disturbances are more likely to generate large changes in election outcomes. According to Wand et al. (2002) , the 2000 U.S. Presidential election was decided by just such a random error. The outcome resultant of this error was significantly different from the policy bundle preferred by the hypothetical median voter. The tendency for religious identities to polarize in the theoretic model and the empirical observation of religious polarization in the U.S. and the other countries suggest that similar events can be anticipated in majority rule elections when religious values supersede economic values in voter decision making.
The US Religious Divide
The hypothesized divide in American society fits in a variety of constructs: red states vs. blue states; religious vs. secular; rich vs. poor; north vs. south. Fiorina et al (2005) present a variety of survey results demonstrating that, despite the red/blue rhetoric, most states and regions comprise a good deal of political diversity. In their analysis, "purple states" would appear to be the norm.
Even where there is evidence of a cultural gap, it is a relatively small gap compared to popular culture war hyperbole. Ansolabehere et al. (2006) support the Fiorina et al claim, with empirical evidence that voting preferences are a greater function of economic preferences, that there is remarkably narrow distribution of opinion over the range of "economic" issues, and that the distribution is single peaked. There does exists a divide over "moral" issues, and this may be the ulitmate source of the "red state -blue state" phenomenon, but they suggest this is likely both an accident of geography and an artifact of a single issue: abortion.
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Neither of these research endeavors denies the heterogeneity of the American population and the opinions its constituents profess. Rather, each makes persistent efforts to refute the overthe-top claims of a divided nation whose members stand in stark opposition to one another. In light of this, Glaeser and Ward (2006) ). Data regarding income and hours worked in the previous week were used to impute a wage rate. We use this imputed wage rate as a measure of the respondent's opportunity cost of time, and assuming sixteen waking hours per day, construct the respondent's "full income" (Becker 1965 ).
See the attached appendix for the survey questions used, response categories, and the imputation of results. Hours dedicated to religious activities were multiplied by the wage rate, and then added to the dollars given to the respondent's religious congregation (tithing, Baylor X R ) to determine the total dollar value of the respondent's involvement in his religious group. From this full income we are able to determine the fraction of a respondent's estimated full income that was dedicated to religious activity associated directly with his or her congregation.
(1 (Darlington 1970) . 6 Kurtosis, however, is a less reliable measure of bimodality when the skew of the distribution does not equal zero. The SAS User's Guide (1989) includes a coefficient of bimodality, essentially kurtosis compensated for skew, that has become been used regularly in the biological sciences (Ellision 1987; Imbert et al. 1996) . The United States income distribution has been characterized using various distributions:
lognormal, gamma, exponential, or some mix there of (McDonald and Ransom 1979; Majumder and Chakravarty 1990; Dragulescu and Yakovenko 2001) . Recent analysis has demonstrated that the top 3 to 5% of the Italian income distribution is Pareto distributed, with the remaining still best understood as lognormal (Clementi and Gallegati 2005) . Lognormal distributions are characterized by a PDF whose log is normally distributed. The US income distribution lognormal, unimodal, and does not have any significant cleavages or gaps. The log of
the other hand, is visually and statistically bimodal, with two distinct subgroups that are at least somewhat symmetrical. In section 4 we introduce a club-theoretic model of religious identity, membership, and sacrifice that generates a similarly polarized distribution of religious commitment from a simulated population of agents with a lognormal distribution of income.
7 DiMaggio et al. (1996) demonstrate that kurtosis can be used as a measure of the degree of bimodality (where the distribution is more bimodal as the kurtosis falls). Similarly, a distribution can be interpreted as "more bimodal" as the bimodality coefficient is increasing. While the bimodality of the logged measures exceeds the critical value for both time ( Table A1 for summary statistics by country). These findings suggest that religious polarization is a pervasive phenomenon and certainly not unique to the United States.
[FIGURE 2]
A Multi-Agent Model of Religious Groups
The economic theory of clubs has been used to study a variety of social phenomena (Buchanan 1965; Cornes and Sandler 1986) . Within the economic study of religion, the club model has arguably been the most successful and frequently employed. Iannaccone's (1992) model of groups that require unproductive costs, termed "sacrifice and stigma," on the behalf of rational, utility-maximizing members is the foundation of this literature. The original model was influential for its ability to explain seemingly irrational behavior on behalf of voluntary members of prohibitive, highly stigmatized religious groups. It should be noted that there is nothing uniquely religious in the construction. It does not employ any supernatural considerations, and can be just as easily applied to secular groups notable for their sacrifice and stigma requirements, such as military units or college fraternities.
We construct our multi-agent computational model with mathematical underpinnings 10 explicitly based on Iannaccone's original model. All changes made to the model serve to adapt the original, relatively austere representative agent model to accommodate a population of heterogeneous agents operating with local spatial interactions across discrete units of time.
Adapting the original model to multi-agent simulation framework allows us to test the 9 There are only 29 countries with R RT distributions because the New Zealand survey did not record respondent labor hours. 10 For other examples of computational models related to political economy, see Kollman et al (2003) .
implications of the club model of religion for an entire religious economy and observe the macro properties emergent within the population. Emergent population properties, in particular the distributional shape, are not analytically tractable (nor necessarily exist) in a representative agent model or a model with a relatively small number of agent "types." We are especially keen to know whether the club model, centered on sacrifice and stigma requirements, is sufficient to generate religious market polarization in a population of agents with unimodally distributed wages and homogeneous preferences.
The club model of religion begins with the premise that agents internally produce their own utility. This production relies on two inputs which are similarly produced by the individual in their secular (private) endeavors and their religious (group) endeavors. Both secular and religious production require commitments of time and money, each of which is limited in supply.
Time endowments are homogenous across individuals, while money is a function of wages which are heterogeneous across the population. What makes the production of the religious input unique is the interdependence of religious production with other members of the group. This interdependence invites members to free ride -to be a member of the group and benefit from the religious production of other members while in turn neglecting her own religious production.
Iannaccone's crucial insight was that the imposition of costly sacrifice and stigma requirements could mitigate the free rider problem, resulting in rational members whose choice to engage in more religious production increased not just their own utility, but the utility of all other members. Examples of group imposed sacrifice and stigma requirements include restrictions on dress, diet, sexual conduct, and social interactions that limit opportunities or stigmatize members by making their religious identity known to others. Such requirements are costly but are not directly productive.
Individuals are heterogeneous in their wages, but identical in their basic preferences.
Similarly, religious groups are heterogeneous in their sacrifice and stigma requirements, but are identical in their capacity to produce a religious "club good." What can in turn emerge is a religious economy within which some groups succeed in attracting members and others fail.
Within this economy, individuals will decide how best to invest their scarce resources -whether to produce their own utility by allocating their time and money to secular endeavors or to their chosen religious group. A spectrum of agent choices will also emerge, including the secular independent, the devout group member, and everything in between.
In the model constructed, each agent produces her own utility with a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function, with inputs of a secular, private good S, and a religious, club good K, preference parameters d S and d K , and a substitution parameter β. S and K are classic "Z-good" arguments in the utility function (Stigler and Becker 1977) . K is produced with a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale and inputs R i , the individual's contribution, and g Q , the "quality" of the other group members' contributions, with output elasticity parameters α and 1-α.
The group quality input, , 11 Additionally, Iannaccone's original model only deals with a single group, and which obviates the need for including the number of members in club quality. 12 The computational model generates outcomes equivalent to the Nash Equilibrium outcome of Iannaccone's original model when constrained to a representative agent. The implied two-group outcome possibility can also be generated if two agent types are employed. 13 The model is written in Java 1.5.1 using the MASON agent modeling library (Luke et al. 2005 
Model Steps
A run of the model consists of initialization followed by a set number of time steps, summarized in the following time structure:
Step [t = 0] Initialization. The model creates and places agents randomly, one per patch. Agents are heterogeneous across wages, pulling random values from a lognormal wage distribution.
Agents are randomly assigned an initial group from a set of G different groups. Upon their creation, agents optimize their values of R and S as a function of their wage and the sacrifice required by their initial group in an iterated Cournot-Nash solution to a game that the agent plays against herself. This is the only time that agents will act without knowledge of their neighbors.
Step [t > 0]. Each model step consists of shuffling the order of agents and one at a time progressing through their ranks. When it is agent i's turn, she will evaluate , gi Q for each prospective group, g, that is represented in her neighborhood. 16 The optimal R and S are determined for each potential group, with the agent joining the utility maximizing group. The choice of group for an agent is a function of her wage, each group's respective sacrifice demanded, the quantity and commitment (in terms of R) of the representatives of each group in her neighborhood, which is in turn a function of their wages and the decisions made by their neighbors, and so forth. The actual emergent collection of groups is a property of a, perhaps, surprisingly complex process for a model rooted in a standard CES structure. In Figure 4 we can view the changing shape of the population distribution as we slowly increase substitutability. Each chart within Figure 4 presents a frequency histogram of the log 17 Further, there is a lower bound to the substitutability parameter given the context of model. If β is too low, and club goods and private goods are sufficiently complementary, their resulting interdependence would make free riding a less beneficial strategy and sacrifice and stigma would be unnecessary. 18 The actual empirical estimate is 0.98. We round to one for simplicity.
Simulation Experiments and Results

Simulation
fraction of full income (
) dedicated to religious club production across the 2,500 simulated agents within a single run of the model. The sequence of charts shows the effect of increased substitutability as the initially unimodal distribution, reflective of the underlying unimodal income distribution, is gradually pulled apart and polarized into a bimodal distribution.
[ is increasing with substitutability, observable in the coefficients on substitutability for regression models of the distribution's kurtosis and bimodality coefficient.
The skewness of the distribution, however, is strictly moved by the mean wage of the population, with the modal individual engaging in less religious group production as the population enjoys higher wages. Lowering the mean population wage pulls the population towards more time intensive club production (higher ). Greater substitutability, on the other hand, offers agents better prospects of specializing in either club or private production, and the great prospect of specialization polarizes the distribution. Weaker substitutability (and in turn, greater complementarity) of private and club utility inputs, on the other hand, squeezes the distribution together, as agents have greater incentive to balance private and club productive activities.
[ Table 2 ]
The coefficients on the mechanical parameters tested, number of time steps and agent neighborhood radius are also reported in Table 2 . Visual inspection of model visualizations (see Figure 3 ) reveals that the greatest population churn occurs in the first hundred steps, after which the model settles into a steady state. 19 Varying the experiment between 100 and 500 steps found no statistical change in the model results; the coefficient on time steps is small and statistically insignificant, approximating zero. Neighborhood radius has a sizeable and statistically significant impact on all four measures of the distribution. The mean, kurtosis, and bimodality of . The increase in bimodality and kurtosis with radius also has an intuitive explanation. As radius increases, agents have a greater selection of local groups to choose from, making them more likely to find a club whose sacrifice rate approaches their ideal club, which increases the segmentation of the market for groups. In smaller radius runs, agents must compromise more, and join clubs that engender a level of commitment that differs further from their optimal situation, pulling agents towards the median. This could be construed as a lowest common denominator effect, 20
Discussion
The bimodality of the data imputed from the Baylor University Religious Survey of the U.S., the international data from the ISSP, and the results of our club-theoretic model simulations reinforce the idea that religious polarization within populations is real, ubiquitous, and a property emergent of religious club formation. This pervasive bimodality of religious commitment, in light of the observed connection between religious values and politics, has interesting political ramifications under a winner take all, majority rule democracy. Econometricians (Bassett Jr. and Persky 1999) and historians of economic thought (Levy and Peart 2002) have identified voting as a form of statistical estimation. Following from this logic, majority rule has statistical properties equivalent to the median. Bimodal distributions have the peculiar property that the mean is a more robust sample estimator than the median; the opposite holds true for symmetric, unimodal distributions. A median estimate of a limited sample from a bimodal distribution is non-robust (Mosteller and Tukey 1977; Levy 1989) ; different samples can result in significantly different estimates. In fact, much of what makes the median a preferred estimator of samples in events such as elections is turned on its head when the population distribution is bimodal. These issues are exasperated as the sample size shrinks.
If a population voted along a single issue dimension, and the population distribution along that issue was bimodal, we could expect that majority voting as a sample estimator would be non-robust. As such, the margin of error associated with the sampling mechanism could be sufficient to change the reported majority winner, even when the candidates occupy significantly different places on the policy continuum on which they were evaluated. We may have witnessed just such an outcome in the 2000 U.S. Presidential election, where different counts from the Florida electoral vote yielded different winners, and votes associated with the notorious "Butterfly" errors 20 were sufficient to swing the election one way or the other (Wand, Shotts et al. 2002) . The convergence of economic preferences observed by Ansolabeohere et al. (2006) and the domination of religiosity over income in voter decision making observed by Glaeser and Ward (2006) , coupled with a bimodal religious commitment distribution, provide a setting within which majority rule is a considerably less robust estimator of voter preferences. Non-robustness of majority rule derivative of the salience of religious commitment and identity is a means by United States has been characterized by a distinct religious regionalism for more than a 100 years now, a regionalism that, until recently had presented a puzzle without solution (Stark et al. 1985; Smith et al. 1998 ). Iannaccone and Makowsky (2007) offer a model that explains the persistence of religious regionalism under conditions of exogenous agent mobility. Given the increasing impact of religion in voter preferences, it should not come as a surprise if regional voting trends similarly persist. 20 The famed "Butterfly" errors were resultant of ballots on which the candidate and their associated hole-punch were not in horizontal alignment, confusing many voters and resulting in a non-trivial number individuals voting for the someone other than their intended candidate. The most common story was told of elderly voters who intended to vote for Al Gore instead voting for Pat Buchanan.
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Although our multi-agent model characterizes people in a relatively simple way, the resulting polarization of the population is compelling. Making sense of the observed parameter correlations in the simulation experiments requires little more than basic economic intuition. The agent population polarizes with regard to religious group commitment as club goods and secular private goods become better substitutes. When substitutability is high, the high wage agents will shift disproportionately towards goods-intensive private production, while low wage agents with shift toward time-intensive club production. On a related level, the correlation of population skew to wages makes sense as well -lower population wages make for more agents pursuing time intensive club production, and vice versa.
In the model constructed, there is a demonstrated minimum level of substitutability for the population to polarize in terms of religious commitment and group membership. For this story of religious polarization to hold for the American population, religious club goods must be a sufficiently strong substitute for privately produced secular goods. In an empirical study of the impact on welfare laws on church contributions, Hungerman (2003) found that a one dollar decrease in county-wide per capita welfare spending lead to an increase of 0.40 dollars in a PCUSA congregations per-member spending on local community projects. In a related study of church spending and market opportunities, Gruber and Hungerman (2006) found that increased secular opportunities through the repealing of blue laws led to 6.3 percent fall in per member church spending. Their findings are indicative of a level of substitutability that is at least compatible with the club-theoretic story of naturally emergent polarization of religious commitment and religious groups in the United States.
Conclusions
Religious bimodality matters not just for matters of social cohesion and cultural "wars" but also for the stability of majority rule voting in democratic elections. Majority rule democracies will be less stable whenever voter preferences are bimodality on a salient issue.
Instability will be further exacerbated when voter preferences on other salient issues are unimodal and inspire convergence in candidate platforms. Substitutability ranges uniformly between 0.5 and 0.9, Mean Wage between 1 and 6. Neighborhood radius between 1 and 9. Models steps between 100 and 500. Each run of the model simulates 2,500 agents. 
